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PRIVACY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
THE CASE FOR TREATING SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AS A HUMAN RIGHT*
Vincent J. Samar**
Members of the Montana Law faculty, distinguished visiting
scholars, students, and guests, let me begin by thanking the mem-
bers of the Montana Law Review for inviting me to speak at this
symposium on privacy and same-sex marriage. I am truly
honored. Having joined others who have written about this topic
in the past, I was wondering, as I prepared this talk, what I could
say that might be new. Then it occurred to me that not too much
has been said specifically on why marriage generally, or same-sex
marriage in particular, ought to be thought of as a human right.
Since the institution of marriage provides a forum for some of
the most private and intimate of human actions to occur, perhaps
it is not surprising that the private side of the institution should
provide the constitutive elements for why the right to marry is a
human right. This is the side of the institution of marriage on
which I will focus. The perspective I will adopt is from morality
and law, but not specifically religion. My argument will defend
same-sex marriage as a human right not for any group, but for
distinctive individuals. It will also show that efforts to exclude
same-sex couples from marriage, as exhibited in a recent New
York Court of Appeals decision, may undermine the value of mar-
riage for everyone.
My talk will have four principle parts. Part I explains why I
believe the right to marry, including same-sex marriage, should be
seen as a human right. Part II then explains why the recent New
York Court of Appeals case that limits marriage to only its exter-
nal attributes demeans human dignity. Next, Part III shows how
human rights and, in particular, human dignity, are served by fo-
cusing on the internal benefits of marriage as a practice. In part
* Editors' Note: This Article is an edited, annotated transcript of the author's speech presented at
the Montana Law Review's Honorable James R. Browning Symposium, The Right to Privacy, held at
The University of Montana School of Law on October 11-13, 2006.
** Vincent J. Samar is Adjunct Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago and Oakton
Community College. The author wishes to thank Professors Martha Minow of the Harvard Law School
and Mark Strasser of Capital University School of Law for their helpful comments and suggestions.
This Article is dedicated to Mark Strasser and his partner George, living proof of a commitment based in
love and dignity.
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IV, I conclude that denying recognition of a legal right to same-sex
marriage is denying a human right.
I. WHY THE RIGHT TO MARRY, INCLUDING SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, Is A HUMAN RIGHT
By a "human right," I mean to reference a right under univer-
sal morality that would be applicable everywhere regardless of
whether or not it is locally recognized. More specifically, human
rights are the rights that all humans have by virtue of being "ac-
tual, prospective, or potential agents."1 Here agency, in the sense
of human voluntariness and purposiveness, plays a foundational
role, since all moral theories must presuppose humans have these
capacities in order to make prescriptive claims. 2 Characteristi-
cally, these rights have been recognized in more specific detail by
such documents as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which recognizes a right to privacy, though not
specifically a right to marry. 3
In American constitutional law, most of what has been said
positively on the subject of same-sex marriage starts with mar-
riage being recognized as a fundamental right under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as in Loving v. Vir-
ginia,4 and then proceeds to challenge any limitation of legal mar-
riage to only opposite-sex couples as a denial of equal protection in
furtherance of the dominant heterosexual culture. 5 The U.S. Su-
preme Court followed this argument in Loving to strike down a
Virginia statute that limited marriage of white people to only
members of their own race as a denial of equal protection because
it was designed to foster white supremacy. 6
Alternatively, on the negative side, it has been argued that
marriage is by definition a xelationship requiring one man and
one woman, and the only equal protection claim that can be raised
is whether everyone has the same right to enter into such a mar-
l. Alan Gewirth, Self-Fulfillment 84 (Princeton U. Press 1998).
2. Moral theories are prescriptive in that they argue for conduct that might otherwise
not occur. In this sense, moral theories differ from even such other theories as exist in
economics and the social sciences, which take as their object behaviors that are likely to
occur and can be predicted given the presence of certain antecedent conditions.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(111) art. 12, UN GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). It should be noted, however, that the Declara-
tion does not impose obligations by its own force under international law.
4. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
5. E.g. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22-34 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
6. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12.
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riage so conceived. 7 I want to claim that the issue of marriage
doesn't break down quite so simply.8 Our conception of marriage,
especially in regard to the latter view, is too much image-directed
and too little criteria-directed. By "image-directed" I mean the
view of marriage that is associated more with churches and wed-
dings, gowns and tuxedos, and religious rituals, versus the view of
divorce that is associated with courtroom drama and legal de-
bate.9 In furtherance of my argument, I want to claim that a right
to same-sex marriage is difficult for many in our society to recog-
nize because most people conceive of marriage as it appears in
popular culture rather than try to understand what legal mar-
riage really is.
So I am not misconstrued on this point: I am not going to ar-
gue that marriage has any special metaphysical status, either of a
natural kind or as a component to some essentialist claim about
human nature.' 0 Although I do not hold the view that everything
is a social construction, surely marriage is a social construction-
of law, culture, and religion." Of course, that does not mean that
people do not have a stake in what does or does not constitute
marriage. Being a cultural creation does not undermine the in-
vestments people have with the particular forms the convention
has evolved to take.12 And although I do not believe that all mar-
7. Cf. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972-73 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring).
8. Indeed, such arguments have been said to be circular. E.g. Halpern v. Atty. Gen. of
Can., 65 O.R. (3d) 161, 181 (Ct. App. Ont. 2003).
9. E.g. Bob Thompson, A Modern Divorce: A Family's Unique Arrangement for Putting
the Children First, Newsday (N.Y.C.) B6 (Jan. 13, 2003) (depicting Americans' image of
divorce as "a sharp-edged collage of uncontrolled rage and debilitating pain"). Contra Good
Morning America's annual spring wedding broadcast-with all the trappings-from Times
Square in New York City. Good Morning America, "Happily Ever After: Love in Times
Square" (ABC May 18, 2001) (TV broad.).
10. Whether sexual orientation is of a natural kind remains an unresolved scientific
issue. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment: The
Case for Same-Sex Marriage 178 (Simon & Schuster 1996).
11. Vincent J. Samar, The Right to Privacy: Gays, Lesbians and the Constitution 68
(Temple U. Press 1991) [hereinafter Samar, The Right to Privacy] (noting that the privacy
interest in marriage is the individual's basic interest in freedom combined with the social
convention of marriage as a means to satisfy that interest); see also John Boswell, The
Marriage of Likeness: Same-Sex Unions in Pre-Modern Europe 28-34 (Fontana Press 1995)
(discussing marriage in the Greco-Roman world).
12.
The relative status of a group within a social system will affect its attractiveness
to actual and prospective members. In this sense, every group operates its own in-
ternal prestige market, but each group is also part of a larger market. Although
individuals constantly move among different groups and subsystems within society
(which is the essence of social mobility), individuals also have strong incentives to
337
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riages need to comport to one style-all religiously blessed or all
having to be sexually closed relationships-I do believe that there
are certain elements forming the concept of marriage that open
the door to a more central, normative conception of what marriage
is all about. 13 The elements I have in mind form the institution of
marriage as a set of socially recognized practices that operate both
to define and benefit the participants, and others who are in vari-
ous ways associated with the participants. While there have been
a number of justifications for legal marriage, including preserva-
tion of property, rearing of children, and providing a first building
block for wider social structures of community, all of these justifi-
cations in effect assign to the parties a socially approved dignity to
manage their own affairs as a collective entity. 14 Some examples I
have in mind are not disinheriting one's spouse, being free of legal
restraints on voluntary sex acts performed between partners in
private, and participant demands against the society at large for
recognition of their unit in the name of law and etiquette. 15
This dignity suggests the demarcation of a unique class of
permissible behaviors that society is excluded from observing too
closely, with exceptions for domestic violence and overt exploita-
tion.16 It also suggests that the core of the legal marriage concept
remain within a particular subsystem and to insulate that system from external
penetration. "One of the noneconomic benefits of remaining within one's neighbor-
hood ethnic group or organization is precisely the avoidance of a free social market,
that is, the avoidance of unremitting and full-scale competition in courtship and
marriage, friendship groups, social clubs, and general esteem." Because prestige
varies across social groups, individuals will be motivated to join higher status
groups, but this option will be closed to many who do not have the ability to make
such a transition.
Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2079, 2118-19 (1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting William J. Goode, The Celebration of
Heroes: Prestige as a Social Control Mechanism 112 (U. Cal. Press 1978)).
13. In his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun wrote,
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours,
that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that
much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual
has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled, Law-
rence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
14. See Boswell, supra n. 11, at 28-34.
15. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2003) (reciting a
very long list of legal responsibilities and benefits that go along with marriage, especially,
but not exclusively, as these relate to the raising of children).
16. See generally Kristine Soul, The Prosecution's Choice: Admitting a Non-Testifying
Domestic Violence Victim's Statements under Crawford v. Washington, 12 Tex. Wes. L. Rev.
689 (2006).
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must involve a set of interrelational prerogatives in which the par-
ticipants can see themselves as advancing their own individual
sense of self-worth by setting the relationship first and their more
individual interests second. 17 In this sense, marriage can be seen
as a dignity-producing institution, just as chess confers a sense of
self-esteem to the players of the game, only in a much more sub-
stantial way, provided all participants adopt certain rules of be-
havior, that is, follow the rules of the game.18 I do not play chess
when I merely move my rook, but only when I move my rook in a
certain way at my turn in the game.19 Without rules to define the
game, I would not achieve the self-esteem of being able to play
chess or the dignity of a chess player. Without marriage, I do not
obtain the public respect of being centrally involved in another
person's life and well-being, in the sense of being in a publicly rec-
ognized relationship in which both participants are committed to
each other's mutual, long-term emotional, physical, economic, and
social welfare. 20 And so, the question for marriage becomes: What
are the necessary conditions for defining a marriage and would
these same criteria define a same-sex marriage?
Here history and tradition can be a help, but only if properly
understood. 21 Roman marriages were primarily a means to pro-
tect property. 22 Such marriages did not serve any internal inter-
est of the parties as a flourishing unit (they did not constitute a
17. In Goodridge, the court noted, "Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commit-
ment to another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality,
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family." Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
18. See Jon Edwards, Chess Is Fun, http://www.princeton.edu/-jedwards/cif/intro.html
(accessed Feb. 9, 2007).
19. Id.
20. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 896 (2005) (showing what distinguishes mar-
riage from cohabitation: "Married couples have chosen obligation; cohabitants have chosen
independence.").
21. Here I follow a view of legal interpretation advanced by Ronald Dworkin that he
calls "law as integrity."
Law as integrity denies that statements of law are either the backward-look-
ing factual reports of conventionalism or the forward-looking instrumental pro-
grams of legal pragmatism. It insists that legal claims are interpretative judg-
ments and therefore combine backward- and forward-looking elements; they inter-
pret contemporary legal practice seen as an unfolding political narrative. So law
as integrity rejects as unhelpful the ancient question whether judges find or in-
vent law; we understand legal reasoning, it suggests, only by seeing the sense in
which they do both and neither.
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 225 (Harvard U. Press 1986).
22. Boswell, supra n. 11, at 46.
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"practice" in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense of the term),23 but only
the more external interests of the parties, which always had to be
seen as a game of winners and losers. In contrast, in early Jewish
marriages and later Christian marriages, the emphasis was on en-
hancing the collective well-being of the participants in the rela-
tionship, and not on maximizing their individual self-interests. 24
In the case of Christian marriages in particular, one emphasis
was bringing new life into the world.25 It is arguable that not all
conceptions of what were essentially seen as Christian mar-
riages-at least in the early church-were focused on procreation,
however. 26 This doesn't mean that self-interest played no role for
these alternative conceptions, but whatever its role at the begin-
ning of a marriage, it was quickly pushed aside for the mutual
benefit that the couple as a whole might achieve from the mar-
riage.27 And so marriage understood in this pre-modern light can
be seen as a practice for supporting a mutually thriving human
dignity that ranges over the deepest levels of human intimacy and
emotion.
Contrary to what most scholars put forth as the bases for
marriage-i.e. relational permanency, financial stability, or child-
rearing-I want to claim that these are more the external attrib-
utes of marriage. 28 I do not claim that these are unimportant at-
tributes, but rather that, like privacy of information and places,
they support a deeper internal structure of private relationships,
despite the fact that they may be the first things to come to mind
when society attempts to define marriage beyond its visual trap-
pings. 29 The more internal structure or "real" stuff of the mar-
riage relationship is its connection to individual human dignity
via the opportunity it provides its participants to achieve levels of
human self-fulfillment that are wholly unique and otherwise un-
23. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 187, 190 (2d ed., U.
Notre Dame Press 1987).
24. Boswell, supra n. 11, at 136 n. 119.
25. Id. at 112.
26. Id. at 115, 119-20.
27. Id. at 121.
28. E.g. Mark Strasser, The Challenge of Same-Sex Marriage: Federalist Principles and
Constitutional Protections 3 (Praeger Publishers 1999) (discussing the interests of the state
in respect to marriage).
29. Samar, The Right to Privacy, supra n. 11, at 75 (noting that while legal recognition
of a private act was last in time in the order of privacy recognitions that the U.S. Supreme
Court had identified, it was prior, logically, to all the others, as it provided the foundation
for why the others ought to be recognized).
Vol. 68340
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obtainable.30 Going back to my chess example, I do not have the
freedom to play, or much opportunity to develop skill at the game
of chess, if I do not have an opponent willing to operate by the
same rules of the game that I operate by.31 That being said, I
want to focus on marriage not as a vehicle to an external group-
centered value, where the group in this case is primarily the two
spouses cooperating in some form of mutually satisfying activity,
or even the betterment of some wider community. Instead, I want
to suggest that marriage does something very positive for the par-
ticipants individually who seek it out, something that, absent a
marriage, they cannot do very well and in some instances cannot
do at all.3 2 I have in mind that while a dedicated partner deprived
of marriage can provide for her other half s future well-being
through innovative use of contracts, wills and trusts, she cannot
replace the benefits marriage provides in respect to social security
benefits, the right to bring a wrongful death action, and being
freed from summons to testify against one's partner, to name a
few examples. Such examples show that individuals cannot very
well imitate marriage without marriage itself. Even the resource-
ful individual is cut off in his "ability to communicate his commit-
30. See Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 143 ("[U]nlike baseball teams and other voluntary as-
sociations, [marriage] is formed, as reflecting the partners' mutual love, for purposes of
deeply intimate union and extensive mutual concern and support for the participants, pur-
poses that enhance the partners' general abilities of agency and thus contribute to their
capacity-fulfillment.").
31. See Edwards, supra n. 18.
32. The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). The Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) provides,
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such a relationship.
The statute was passed to allow the federal government and the states to opt out of having
to recognize same-sex marriages under section 1 of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution,
which requires that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." The ground for the statute follows
a further provision in section 1 that Congress may "prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 1. Whether DOMA is constitutional under Article IV or the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause has not yet come before the U.S. Supreme Court for decision. It
might be further noted that a number of states have passed "mini-DOMAs" to avoid a simi-
lar situation from arising under their state conflict of law rules. Carlos A. Ball, The Back-
lash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its
Aftermath, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 1493, 1524 (2006) (noting that thirty-seven states
had passed mini-DOMAs and four had amended their state constitutions to prohibit same-
sex marriage).
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ment and goal to constitute himself in a certain way, expressive of
a certain (and widely shared) view of the good life, including obli-
gations and opportunities."33 That is why marriage, in my view,
should be understood as a human right.
To say that human rights represent a set of norms that arise
from one's own point of view as human, I am asserting what I be-
lieve is an internal value that must be inter-subjectively affirmed
not on its descriptive content of how the possibility of human ac-
tions give rise to legitimate rights-claims, but on its normative,
self-reflective content that makes these rights-claims valuable as
such.34 In other words, one might say externally that, because
human actions presuppose the generic features of voluntariness
and purposiveness, no human being can deny equal rights to free-
dom and well-being to any other human being without contra-
dicting himself.35 This would be particularly true when the free-
dom at stake does not interfere with any other person's right or, if
it does, only by some assumption of facts or social conventions that
would not justify the freedom being overridden. 36 The argument
should also be viewed as providing an external, logical justifica-
tion for believing all humans have certain rights.3 7
What translates this outside justification specifically to an in-
ternal evaluation by the agent of his own worth is the awareness
that the rights being so-valued come about only because the agent
33. E-mail from Martha Minow, Prof. at Harvard L. Sch. to Author (Sept. 2006) (copy
on file with Author).
34. Here I, like Gewirth, am following in the Kantian tradition that assigns to reason a
command authority set by rational requirements of consistency for obtaining universal
maxims of action. Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 226; see also Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals and What Is Enlightenment? §§ 1-2, 9-64 (Lewis White Beck trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959).
35. See Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 81-82.
36. See Samar, The Right to Privacy, supra n. 11, at 69, 107-08, 113.
37. Interestingly, though not based specifically on the justification just offered, the
Lawrence Court noted that,
the European Court of Human Rights considered a case... [where an] adult male
resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired
to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland for-
bade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been
searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that the laws pro-
scribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human
Rights.
Lawrence -). Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. U.K, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. I 52
(1981)).
342 Vol. 68
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values his own actions simply because they are his actions. 38 Put
another way, the dignity she assigns to her own creative capacity
to achieve her aspirations is affirmed when the agent recognizes
that it is that very capacity, including its reliance on the canons of
deductive and inductive logic that she intuits, that makes such
rights-claims possible.39 In this sense, the agent's pro-attitude to-
wards those actions that reflect her own self-interest becomes a
sense of self-respect for her ability as a creative creature to engi-
neer actions which systematically advance the interests of all
other humans as well. 40 The latter arises only because the possi-
bility of achieving her self-interest, when logically pruned, is a
human interest.41 The agent thus affirms those goods that benefit
humans as such, not because some outside moral principle sets
them, but because, from her own understanding of what it is to be
human, those goods are constitutive of that understanding.42
38. "Effective possession of the rights to freedom and well-being is an essential part of
capacity-fulfillment," which "sit[s] in reasoned judgment over aspiration-fulfillment."
Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 93, 101.
39. Here it might be claimed that my argument is internally inconsistent if self-fulfill-
ment is viewed as an egoistic-teleological concept whose goal for human action is to pro-
mote personal happiness, while human rights are generally justified on some universal
deontological basis that may place restrictions on how personal happiness can be obtained.
For example, if I were to gain self-fulfillment from engaging in genocide, human rights may
require that I not do so. But this is to suggest an inconsistency where none exists. For by
self-fulfillment I do not mean that the agent's values emerge from his idiosyncratic aspira-
tions alone, but rather from his ability to reason through the canons of deductive and in-
ductive logic first to those aspirations he holds qua human and only after that to more
individual or group-based aspirations (like being a Catholic, for example), provided they
also violate no one else's rights. Because the rights-claim the agent asserts is logically the
same claim others can assert, there can be no special privilege for the agent's own position.
The range of the agent's self-fulfillment is thus not unbounded, but constrained by the very
constituting reasons that justify its centrality as a human right. See id. at 215-16.
40. "In self-respect what one values is one's moral qualities, including one's dignity as a
moral person who is worthy of the respect of other persons." Id. at 94.
41. "Since the generic rights are rights had equally by all agents, and since all humans
are actual, prospective, or potential agents, the generic rights are now seen to be human
rights." Id. at 84.
42. In effect, we have a situation analogous to the Prisoner's Dilemma in which two
prisoners who cannot communicate with each other are both told by the prosecutor, "if you
turn state's witness against the other prisoner, I will let you go free and the other prisoner
will receive three years confinement." It also turns out that if both prisoners confess, they
each get two years for making the court's job easier. However, if neither confesses, they
will only be convicted of a lesser offense and each get one year. Both prisoners are highly
motivated to confess to receive the lesser penalty. Yet, if they rationally assess their situa-
tion they will see that their best choice in terms of fewer years' confinement would be for
neither to confess. See e.g. Stanford Ency. of Phil., Prisoner's Dilemma, http:/plato.
stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ (updated Aug. 11, 2003).
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In saying this, I do not suggest that all human actions need
necessarily form a consistent and mutually beneficial practice.
The condition of these actions being human and engendering their
appeal to self-respect is that they can be undertaken without vio-
lating any other human being's rights. In this sense, the attribu-
tion of dignity that the agent assigns to her own actions is neces-
sarily supervenient on her being a voluntary, purposive human
agent. 43 I use the word "necessarily" here to indicate that the con-
nection between the agent's purpose for acting, her assignment of
worth to that purpose, and her assignment of dignity and preser-
vation to herself and all other purposive agents, is logical and not
contingent. 44 Still, such actions may serve a more narrow purpose
of advancing, without harm to anyone else, more particular idio-
syncratic interests of some narrowly defined group-such as doc-
tors, lawyers, teachers, etc.-or even just the individual herself.45
Especially, or in those situations where a person's actions advance
the collective interests of some group without harming others,
they may become part of a mutually beneficial practice such as
medicine, law, or education, to name just a few. 46 Still, even at
this narrower construal of the worth afforded some actions, the
freedom and well-being to perform the acts can be seen to advance
the interests of all other persons by providing others a precedent
for seeking their own self-fulfillment qua human.47
To say that marriage allows the individual to set the end of
his own personhood into the mind and the heart of the other in a
singular way, is to suggest that marriage gives rise to a "corporate
person" whose interests are not merely the summation of the in-
terests of the parties involved. The interests of the couple qua
43. Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 173. "Properties of type A are supervenient on properties of
type B if and only if two objects cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also
differing with respect to their B-properties." The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 778
(Robert Audi ed., 2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 1995). It is only limited by the agent standing
in the same shoes as all other prospective purposive agents.
44. Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 173.
45. See id. at 142.
46. See infra nn. 83-86 and accompanying text. Here I am following Alasdair
MacIntyre's definition of a practice.
47. The point being that within the constraints of universal morality is the freedom to
further restrain oneself to obtain specific goods either systematically as a group (called
"particularist morality"), like joining a community of ascetic monks, or individually (called
"personalist morality"), like living the austere life of the artist. The only proviso is that the
choice must be real or, at least, not coerced by social, political or economic conditions that
could otherwise be avoided. When the latter occurs, those who have the power to alleviate
the conditions are not following the requirements of universal morality. See generally
Gewirth, supra n. 1, at ch. 4.
344 Vol. 68
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/7
2007 SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 345
couple are not only the interests of the group constituted by the
duo in any given marriage, but also the interests of the group con-
stituted by those committed to a marriage both as a publicly rec-
ognized and celebrated institution.48 Let me explain more fully
what I mean. Because part of what I want to say here involves the
usual legal bundle of rights and obligations we assign to marriage,
it is only natural to focus on these rights and privileges as the
primary interests of the parties to the marriage. 49 But in the
48. See Robert Justin Lipkin, The Harm of Same-Sex Marriage: Real or Imagined? 11
Widener L. Rev. 277, 308 (2005) (arguing that legal recognition of same-sex marriage might
harm "those individuals and couples committed exclusively to the traditional notion of mar-
riage" as one man and one woman, while at the same time benefiting those seeking through
such deliberative democratic norms as liberty and equality, a place where all minorities
obtain full citizenship (emphasis added)).
49. One example of these rights and obligations is found in Vermont's statutes, Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1204(e)(1) to 1204(e)(24) (2005), which extend the same legal rights as
apply to marriage to the following non-exclusive list of legal areas:
(1) laws relating to title, tenure, descent and distribution, intestate succession,
waiver of will, survivorship, or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership, or
transfer, inter vivos or at death, of real or personal property, including eligibility
to hold real and personal property as tenants by the entirety... ;
(2) causes of action related to or dependent upon spousal status, including an ac-
tion for wrongful death, emotional distress, loss of consortium, dramshop, or other
torts or actions under contracts reciting, related to, or dependent upon spousal
status;
(3) probate law and procedure, including nonprobate transfer;
(4) adoption law and procedure;
(5) group insurance for state employees . . . and continuing care contracts;
(6) spouse abuse programs... ;
(7) prohibitions against discrimination based upon marital status;
(8) victim's compensation rights ...
(9) workers' compensation benefits;
(10) laws relating to emergency and nonemergency medical care and treatment,
hospital visitation and notification, including the Patient's Bill of Rights ... and
the Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights . .
(11) advance directives . .. ;
(12) family leave benefits . ..
(13) public assistance benefits under state law;
(14) laws relating to taxes imposed by the state or a municipality;
(15) laws relating to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital commu-
nication privilege;
(16) the homestead rights of a surviving spouse .. . and homestead property tax
allowance ... ;
(17) laws relating to loans to veterans . ..
(18) the definition of family farmer ... ;
(19) laws relating to the making, revoking and objecting to anatomical gifts by
others ... ;
(20) state pay for military service ...
(21) application for earlier voter absentee ballot . . .
(22) family landowner rights to fish and hunt... ;
(23) legal requirements for assignment of wages ... ; and
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more fundamental sense, the status of marriage for the individual
participants is itself a new creation. 50 After marriage, the couple
assumes a new ontological identity, in which the participants see
themselves as "us" rather than "me," just as they see their prop-
erty as "ours" rather than "mine."51 I do not suggest the creation
ofjust another legal fiction, for the most important feature of mar-
riage is not that the law should treat the parties and their prop-
erty as a collective, though certainly it should.52 The most salient
feature is that the parties actually come to see themselves as a
collective unit operating for their mutual benefit, and also as part
of a still larger set of similarly situated persons. 53 This is why, to
quote the old song, "[breaking up is hard to do."54 For the lan-
guage we adopt as a corporate legal couple is a language of the
plural; the interests at stake are the couple's interests which are
often balanced in various ways to achieve different levels of satis-
faction at different times depending on the emotional importance
each party attaches to the interests. This is why it is hard-after
(24) affirmance of relationship.
50. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretative Frame-
work for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 Regent U. L. Rev. 221 (2005).
51. Professor Eskridge has noted that any discussion of marriage would be incomplete
without a complete understanding of the obligations it entails that do not exist among sin-
gle people. Eskridge, supra n. 10, at 70-74.
52. See generally Goutam U. Jois, Marital Status as Property: Toward a New Jurispru-
dence for Gay Rights, 41 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 509, 509-10 (2006) (arguing
that there is a property right in the status of marriage itself that should be recognized
under the Takings Clause).
53. In Plato's Symposium, we find the following speech on the mythological origins of
love. Originally, human beings were giants composed of four arms and four legs and two
sets of genitalia, either two male, or two female, or a combination of male and female. Once
the god Zeus cuts them in half to create gay, lesbian and heterosexual persons, the follow-
ing is said,
[W]hen this boy lover-or any lover, for that matter-is fortunate enough to meet
his other half, they are both so intoxicated with affection, with friendship, and
with love, that they cannot bear to let each other out of sight for a single instant.
It is such reunions as these that impel men to spend their lives together, although
they may be hard put to it to say what they really want with one another, and
indeed, the purely sexual pleasures of their friendship could hardly account for the
huge delight they take in one another's company. The fact is that both their souls
are longing for a something else-a something to which they can neither of them
put a name, and which they can only give an inkling of in cryptic sayings and
prophetic riddles.
Plato, Symposium, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters 526, 545.
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Michael Joyce, trans., Princeton U. Press
1980).
54. The Carpenters, Breaking Up is Hard to Do, inA Kind of Hush (A&M 1976) (33 rpm
record) (cover version of Neil Sedaka, Breaking Up is Hard to Do, in Neil Sedaka Sings His
Greatest Hits (RCA 1962) (33 rpm record)).
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one has gotten used to seeing oneself as part of a couple-to con-
vert back to a language of self, in which the only interest to be
primarily concerned with, at least once one's general obligations to
society and others are taken into account, is self-interest. 55
But notice nothing in what I have said has evoked as its start-
ing point the external attributes of permanency, financial stabil-
ity, or child rearing that society teaches should be sought from
marriage. 56 Instead, I have focused solely on the individual self-
fulfillment that attends being part of a corporate entity that
shares both intimacy and identity. In this sense, society's teach-
ing only supports what appears that humans will externally want
if given the opportunity, and not what they really want internally
because they truly understand their own self-interest. This, more
than anything else, is why marriage is important, why it's a
human right and not just a utilitarian cost/benefit solution to a
certain set of collective, external problems, and further, why
same-sex marriage is fundamentally no different from opposite-
sex marriage. Indeed, it is for just the reason that a unique kind
of human self-fulfillment can be achieved by marriage that the
claimed right of same-sex couples to marry can be justified as a
fundamental human right. Put another way, the right to marry is
a unique human right fulfilling a significant route to human self-
fulfillment by allowing the parties to the marriage to achieve an
identity that significantly adds to their human dignity. Thus, not
to recognize this right, even if just in the same-sex context, is to
deny an important avenue of human self-fulfillment that is a foun-
dation of human rights in general. This denial of human rights
has happened in several recent state court decisions, one of which
I will turn to now.57
55. Supra n. 29 and accompanying text. Mark Strasser has noted that society could not
prevent divorce because it provides the opportunity for one to "be able to meet someone else
and eventually have an enduring, fulfilling, successful marriage." Mark Strasser, Legally
Wed: Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution 129 (Cornell U. Press 1997).
56. E.g. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
57. While I will be primarily discussing Hernandez, other recent cases also fail to recog-
nize same-sex marriage as a human right. Andersen v. King Co., 138 P.3d 963, 994 (Wash.
2006); Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Co. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 464 (Ariz. App. 2003).
But see Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
individuals have a state right to same-sex marriage under the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion's equal protection clause, but not under its due process clause); Baker v. Vt., 744 A.2d
864, 912 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the Vermont Legislature must adopt an equivalence for
marriage for same-sex couples under the Vermont Constitution's common benefits clause-
Vermont doesn't have an equal protection clause-as opposed to its due process clause). Cf
Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage versus Unions, 54
DePaul L. Rev. 783, 785 (2005) (arguing that Vermont-styled civil union statutes, while
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II. WHY LIMITING MARRIAGE ONLY TO ITS EXTERNAL
ATTRIBUTES DEMEANS HuMAN DIGNITY
The recent majority decision by New York's high court in Her-
nandez v. Robles58 illustrates why an external perspective on a
right to marriage is demeaning of human dignity. In that case,
petitioners brought suit against the administrator of the New
York City Marriage License Bureau claiming the law authorizing
the clerk to issue marriage licenses either permitted issuance of
such licenses to same-sex couples or was unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the New
York Constitution.5 9
Like the federal Constitution, New York's constitutional law
recognizes marriage, at least between opposite-sex couples, as a
fundamental right.60 Indeed, the New York high court noted that
"[in general, we have used the same analytical framework as the
[U.S.] Supreme Court in considering due process cases, though
our analysis may lead to different results."61 Furthermore, "we
have held that our [state] Equal Protection Clause 'is no broader
in coverage than the Federal provision.' "62 In order to first say
same-sex marriage was not contemplated by the statute governing
issuances of marriage licenses, the court cited provisions in the
statute using the terms "husband and wife," " 'the groom' and 'the
bride.' "63
The court then began its state constitutional analysis noting
that for a fundamental right to be founded on the basis of due
process, it must have been part of a longstanding tradition and
history of the country.64 However, in order to avoid the challenge
that its interpretation of the state's due process clause might be
granting all the legal rights and benefits of marriage under state law, still fail to provide
true equality insofar as they allow a normative distinction to exist between same-sex un-
ions and opposite-sex marriage).
58. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1.
59. Id. at 5-6.
60. Id. at 14-15.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id. (quoting Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v. City of N.Y,
482 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1985)).
63. Id. at 6; see also id. at 13, 15 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (noting that despite "scientific
advances in assisted reproduction technology, the fact remains that the vast majority of
children are conceived naturally through sexual contact between a woman and a man").
64. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 14; but see id. at 26 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (noting "[tihe
claim that marriage has always had a single and unalterable meaning is a plain distortion
of history" (citing Br. of Profs. of History and Fain. L. as Amici Curiae in Support of Pls. at
1-3, Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1)).
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too narrow when focused on just same-sex marriage as opposed to
marriage in general, the court had to make an incredible policy
argument.65 The court held that because unexpected pregnancies
can result in opposite-sex relationships, the legislature could have
found that "unstable relationships between people of the opposite
sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or
grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples
... .*"66 The court was unable to merely say that marriage was
necessary to secure procreation or various protections of children
born to opposite-sex couples because, as the court even admitted,
many same-sex couples in New York are able to raise children le-
gally either by artificial insemination or adoption. 67 As a result,
the court had to suggest, for purposes of New York constitutional
law, that the legislature could view opposite-sex couples as too
emotionally unstable to handle intimate relationships without the
government affording the opposite-sex couple a right to marry, es-
pecially when children might be involved.68
The New York high court next considered the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim. Since the court had already determined that
same-sex marriage was not a due process right, this meant that
the state denying the right to same-sex couples would not be re-
viewed with strict scrutiny under an equal protection analysis un-
less the regulated group itself was a protected class warranting
either strict or intermediate scrutiny.69 The plaintiffs had not ar-
gued that strict scrutiny should apply in an equal protection argu-
ment, since the plaintiffs did not allege the traditionally protected
classifications of race, color, ethnicity, or national origin or offer
any new argument for treating same-sex couples as a similarly
situated class warranting strict scrutiny protection. 70 And since
the court had already rejected the plaintiffs' claim that same-sex
marriage was a fundamental right, the only question the court
65. In his dissent, Judge Kaye noted that "fundamental rights, once recognized, cannot
be denied to particular groups on the ground that these groups have historically been de-
nied those rights." Id. at 22-23 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 7 (majority).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 10; see also id. at 19 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (explaining his analysis of the
level of scrutiny that applies-strict, intermediate, or rational relation-to the state's mar-
riage classification scheme).
70. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10 (majority). This too is an interesting point because
the general criteria traditionally thought to determine when a classification becomes sus-
pect for equal protection purposes were not followed by the court. See id. at 23-24 (Kaye,
J., dissenting).
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faced was whether intermediate scrutiny applied, either because
the marriage statute discriminated based on gender or because
sexual orientation itself deserved heightened scrutiny. 71
Race, color, ethnicity, and national origin are reviewed under
a strict scrutiny standard under both federal and New York state
constitutional law because such classifications are considered sus-
pect, resulting from historical discrimination and stereotyping
based on an immutable or hard-to-remove trait that the group did
not have the political power to overcome. 72 Gender and illegiti-
macy are afforded intermediate scrutiny because while not all
forms of discrimination against these groups were thought to be
improper, much of the discrimination these groups have suffered
was based on stereotyping and prejudice. 73 Since obviously
neither race, color, ethnicity, nor religion (also deserving strict
scrutiny)74 were issues in the present case, the court was free to
consider the question of gender at the intermediate level of scru-
tiny once it had determined a fundamental right was not involved.
The Hernandez court noted that the marriage statute treated
men and women alike in that neither could marry a person of the
same sex and that the distinction was not a kind of "sham equal-
ity" as was the distinction in Loving v. Virginia,75 where the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down miscegenation statutes because the
statutes were " 'designed to maintain White Supremacy.' "76 As
for the question of whether sexual orientation itself warranted
heightened scrutiny after the New York court's earlier decision in
Under 21 v. City of New York 77-where the level of scrutiny ques-
tion was left open-the court stated: "We resolve this question in
this case on the basis of the [U.S.] Supreme Court's observation
that no more than rational basis scrutiny is generally appropriate
71. Id. at 11.
72. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (reaffirming that racial and ethnic
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (identifying what constitutes a suspect class).
73. U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (A statutory scheme that distinguishes be-
tween males and females is subject to heightened scrutiny, and must "serv[e] important
governmental objectives," and "the discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.").
74. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Sts. v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982)); Catho-
lic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 28 A.D.3d 115, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept.
2006).
75. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11.
76. Id. at 8 (quoting Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
77. Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v. City of N.Y., 482 N.E.2d 1
(N.Y. 1985).
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'where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguish-
ing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the author-
ity to implement.' ",78 The Hernandez court held that the legisla-
ture could distinguish between opposite-sex and same-sex couples
on the basis of protecting children.79 In effect, because the court
held that same-sex couples were not members of a protected class
invoking strict or intermediate scrutiny, the contested govern-
ment action need only meet rational basis review, a decidedly low
hurdle.80 Consequently, the court only considered whether the
statute was rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. In effect, this meant that the statute would be upheld, at
least so long as the statute was not supported by mere animus
against a specific group.
The question of animus arises because in Romer v. Evans, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Colorado's constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting the state legislature and its municipalities from
granting any protections against discrimination to gays and lesbi-
ans was based on mere animus towards the group and was there-
fore not a legitimate governmental interest.8 1 The U.S. Supreme
Court implied that, because the Colorado amendment was so over-
broad, it constituted on its face a per se violation of equal protec-
tion.8 2 Although the Hernandez majority never cited Romer, the
majority of New York's high court probably had Romer in mind
when it took the rather odd approach of justifying the legislature's
limitation of marriage to only opposite-sex couples to correct an
infirmity that supposedly only opposite-sex couples might suffer:
an inability to handle the consequences of their intimate relation-
ships.83
This is an odd approach because it demeans opposite-sex
couples while at the same time affirming their exclusive right to
marry. Yet, it bespeaks the extremes to which a court will go to
maintain what is in reality an animus by some in society toward
lesbian and gay people and their relationships. Moreover, what is
particularly insidious about the Hernandez decision is its limited
78. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 441 (1985)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
82. Id.
83. I emphasize the infirmity that the court associates as the legislature's stand to-
wards opposite-sex couples because it seems hard to otherwise understand why a "legiti-
mate" legislative purpose should be framed in this way. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11.
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account of the equal interests in stability and support that chil-
dren of same-sex couples have in comparison to their opposite-sex
couple counterparts, not to mention the interests of the parties
themselves in seeking to marry.8 4 The latter is illustrated by the
court's disjunctive language of the interests surveyed between op-
posite-sex and same-sex relationships. The interests of both types
of relationships could more easily have been compared along
dimensions of dignity and individual commitment to undertake
obligations, which constitute a family.
III. How HUMAN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, HUMAN DIGNITY
ARE SERVED BY FOCUSING ON THE INTERNAL
BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE AS A PRACTICE
Here I would begin by adopting Alasdair MacIntyre's defini-
tion of a practice:
By a "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex form
of socially established cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropri-
ate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the re-
sult that human powers to achieve excellence, and human concep-
tions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
8 5
Important to the definition is the distinction MacIntyre sets out
between internal and external goods. The latter are identified as
the property of some person such that the more one has, the less
remains available for others.8 6 The former are goods arising
within the practice whose achievement through competition bene-
fits "the whole community who participate in the practice."87 Con-
sequently, the internal goods of a practice can be seen as a set of
values that enrich the group as a whole without loss or diminish-
84. See id. at 7-8; see also Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich & Galit Moskowitz, In the In-
terest of Children of Same-Sex Couples, 19 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Laws. 255, 256 (2005)
(arguing that "[einding the ban on same-sex marriage would be in the best interest of chil-
dren of same-sex couples both legally and psychologically"); see also Justin R. Pasfield, Con-
fronting America's Ambivalence towards Same-Sex Marriage: A Legal and Policy Perspec-
tive, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 267, 299-304 (2005) (arguing that much policy evidence shows that
children suffer when same-sex marriage rights are denied). But see Brenda Cossman, Con-
testing Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Policy & L. 415, 499 (2005) (noting that some non-libertarian, social conserva-
tives argue that children's interest in having opposite-sex parents far outweighs the same-
sex marriage choice).
85. MacIntyre, supra n. 23, at 175.
86. Id. at 178.
87. Id.
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ment to anyone else.8 8 The goods of marriage fit well within this
definition of internal goods.
Marriage can be conceived as a practice in which the individ-
ual participants engage in an obviously complex form of socially
cooperative human activities in which the aim is to make possible
for both spouses opportunities to enhance for each other their non-
conflicting mutual benefits and psychological well-being.8 9 In this
sense, marriage clearly adds to the participants' capacities as
agents to participate in each others' mutual benefit. In some
cases, this may mean joint cooperation towards achieving certain
family, economic, or social goals such as deciding where to live,
whether to raise children, what employment opportunities to pur-
sue, how to aid each other's efforts to achieve further formal edu-
cation, how to develop a family retirement plan, what means
should be chosen to provide for family finances, how to oversee
and maintain personal and real property, and what methods
should be adopted for deciding matters involving ill health or
death.90 In other cases, and these may be related to the more
overt economic and social advantages, marriage means providing
for each other a sense that each is not alone in confronting life's
joys and difficulties on an ongoing, at least semi-permanent, basis,
and in knowing that whatever important choices the individual
participants face, their importance to the other cannot be without
significance. 91 The latter is even more significant when the ac-
tions directly or indirectly affect the other, or persons to whom
88. MacIntyre noted that one might induce a bright child to develop the analytic and
strategic skills (internal goods) associated with chess by initially bribing them with candy
bars (an external good) in the hope that the child will eventually take solace in the rewards
that skill at the game itself provides. Id. at 175.
89. In Lawrence v. Tex., the Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex
sodomy between consenting adults in private, and held:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
90. See Ryan Nishimoto, Marriage Makes Cents: How Law & Economics Justifies
Same-Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. Third World L.J. 379, 384-85 (2003).
91. See Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals, Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage, 18 BYU J.
Pub. L. 371, 417-18 (2004) (arguing that what matters most in producing a committed
marriage is whether two people are physically and emotionally attracted to each other).
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both have obligations, such as the participants' children.9 2 It may
also matter in the sense that, because one party is so engaged by
an action, the other's mere presence provides some solitude and
peace of mind that at least everything else is okay.93
Obviously, these benefits of marriage are truly internal inso-
far as their possession by one couple does not limit their availabil-
ity to others outside that marriage. That is why claims that al-
lowing same-sex couples to marry will undermine the meaning
and significance of marriage for opposite-sex persons are ludi-
crous.9 4 Does anybody really expect that their opposite-sex spouse
will leave him or her if the same-sex couple down the street gets
married? If that were to happen, it would not be because the
same-sex couple got married, but because the opposite-sex couple
had not obtained or was no longer obtaining enough of the inter-
nal rewards of marriage that made the practice worthwhile for
them.9 5
In saying this, it is important to recognize a legitimate con-
straint on what benefits, mutual or not, a society needs to recog-
nize. Just because a practice is claimed to benefit the parties con-
cerned does not in itself mean the practice should be endorsed,
especially when it is controversial whether the practice benefits
the well-being of its participants.9 6 For example, while the so-
called "drug culture" may, at least when followed to excess, reflect
a practice that adversely affects the well-being of both partici-
92. See e.g. Edward Egan Smith, The Criminalization of Belief When Free Exercise
Isn't, 42 Hastings L.J. 1491 (1991) (discussing a case upholding the criminal conviction of a
mother who prayed instead of seeking out medical help when her child suffered for seven-
teen days with diagnosed meningitis).
93.
At its best, love is a deep desire to be unified with the beloved; it includes intense
pleasure both in the other's company and in the hope for its continuation and per-
petuation. It is strongly concerned with the other's happiness; it is wishing of good
for her for her own sake, in a way that goes far beyond general benevolence, for it
includes a special feeling of responsibility for the other's fate as linked with your
own.
Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 146.
94. See e.g. John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations:
Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 Am. J. Juris. 97, 100 (1997) (arguing
that same-sex marriage diminishes the institution of marriage). For a broader discussion
of this topic from a religious perspective see generally Michael J. Perry, Christians, the
Bible, and Same-Sex Unions: An Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 449 (2001).
95. See e.g. Karl Augustine, Reasons for Divorce: What Constitutes Viable Reasons for
Thinking about or Wanting a Divorce? http://www.selfgrowth.com/articlesIAugustine8.html
(accessed Feb. 3, 2007).
96. See Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 154.
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pants and non-participants, some contend that criminal sanctions
against users of illegal drugs creates a still-greater harm to all
concerned. 97 But what differentiates this cultural practice from
other cultural practices that might justify imposing sanctions is
that the so-called "internal benefits" of the practice are masquer-
ading over what are really just seductions to suffer greater per-
sonal or social harms. In contrast, denial of the right to legally
marry a same-sex partner, as opposed to its recognition, repre-
sents a detriment to all those who would be served by marriage
but-because of their sexual orientation, over which they have no
choice, and law, for which society has choice-cannot partici-
pate.98
What principle then should govern the choice of which prac-
tices to recognize or at least tolerate and which not to recognize,
when arguably many practices might add to individual self-fulfill-
ment? The answer must be connected to a full disclosure of all
known potential risks and assurance that the human rights of
others are not violated in the process. 99 In other words, from a
human rights point-of-view, practices that add to human self-ful-
fillment are morally justified when they enhance the mutual dig-
nity of all involved in the practice without denying dignity to those
97. Id.; see also Melissa T. Aoyagi, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dia-
logue on International Drug Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. Intl. L. & Pol. 555 (2005) (encouraging
state opportunities to explore alternatives to criminalization); MaryBeth Lipp, A New Per-
spective on the "War on Drugs" Comparing the Consequences of Sentencing Policies in the
United States and England, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 979 (2004) (questioning whether punitive
sentencing creates more social problems than a relatively free market in drugs); Joshua C.
LaGrange, Law, Economics, and Drugs: Problems with Legalization under a Federal Sys-
tem, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 505, 506-13 (2000) (highlighting economic difficulties applying the
neo-classical legalization arguments in a federal system). See generally Douglas Husak &
Peter de Marneffe, The Legalization of Drugs (Cambridge U. Press 2005).
98. In his dissent, Judge Kaye noted: "Solely because of their sexual orientation, how-
ever-that is, because of who they love-plaintiffs are denied the rights and responsibili-
ties of civil marriage." Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dis-
senting).
99.
[T]hrough the universal right to freedom, persons have rights to form families and
to have the concomitant preferential concerns. This justification does not extend
to violations of other persons' rights as upheld by universalist morality, and it also
prohibits the nepotism whereby a family member who holds an official position,
such as judge or teacher, uses it to favor another family member by giving him a
lighter sentence or a higher grade than the rules of his position require. For in
such cases to act against the impartiality required by the respective rules is to
violate the moral rights of other persons upheld by universalist morality.
Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 143.
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whose relation to the practice is not a matter of choice.100 Hence,
state-mandated racial segregation in public schools would not be
justified, even if it were possible to provide equal facilities, be-
cause abundant social science research shows that such segrega-
tion produces a sense of inferiority in members of one race in their
relation to the other. 101 A similar sense of inferiority may accom-
pany restricting the marital relationship to only opposite-sex
couples, for even the very limited purpose of protecting the chil-
dren of opposite-sex couples, if the society reads that validation as
legitimating the relationship itself. In that instance, the external
justification is likely to bear negatively on the internal valuation
of the participants themselves. 10 2
In contrast, restrictions on arranged marriages or marriages
between minors do not encounter the same difficulty. For minors,
there is a serious question at what age minors have developed the
capacity of choice with sufficient knowledge of relevant circum-
stances to be able to enter the marriage relationship. Similarly, in
the case of arranged marriages, the parties to the marriage and
the beneficiaries of the internal rewards have no real choice. As
freedom serves as the foundation of the right to marry, it follows
100.
[Tiwo general normative relations [emerge] between cultural pluralism and the
moral universalism of human rights. Negatively, moral universalism sets the
outer limits of the legitimacy of the various practices of cultural pluralism. Af-
firmatively, within these limits moral universalism encourages and upholds the
diverse practices of cultural pluralism, the differences between human beings with
regard to values and ways of life, as diverse paths to capacity-fulfillment.
Id. at 157.
101. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that state-mandated,
separate-but-equal education violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection, as it creates a sense of inferiority in children of minority families that they
carry the rest of their lives); see also U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 535-46 (1996) (holding that
Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women violates the federal and state constitu-
tional requirement to afford equal protection of the laws). Note the same condition may not
be true when a school is established specifically to provide a safe and welcoming environ-
ment for young people coming to grips with a homosexual orientation. See Louis P. Nap-
pen, Why Segregated Schools for Gay Students May Pass a "Separate But Equal" Analysis
but Fail Other Issues and Concerns, 12 Wm. & Mary J. Women L. 101 (2005); Nicolyn
Harris & Maurice R. Dyson, Safe Rules or Gays' Schools? The Dilemma of Sexual Orienta-
tion Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 183 (2004).
102. Here the issue is
not with the ways in which cultural groups may treat their individual members by
violating their human rights, but rather with the ways in which diverse cultural
groups may themselves be treated by the state or society at large .... What [uni-
versal morality] requires here is that cultural pluralism be affirmatively pro-
tected: the right to cultural pluralism is an affirmative as well as a negative right.
Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 155.
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that such marriages violate the human right to freedom that all
people have qua human. 10 3 Moreover, arranged marriages may
violate the human right to well-being, as emotional concerns may
be too personal to be adequately provided in advance, even by
well-meaning parents.
This then raises the troubling question of polygamous mar-
riages. The issue is troubling not because the social standard is
for two-person marriages, but because where polygamous mar-
riages have been allowed, in the context of opposite-sex relation-
ships, they usually support patriarchic relationships. 10 4 In in-
stances where, on the one hand, only men are allowed more than
one companion or where the economics of the relationship provide
an artificial domination by one party (usually a male) over the
other parties, the freedom component that must attend any truly
universal system of human rights is not satisfied.10 5 On the other
hand, providing for marriage between same-sex couples in no way
diminishes this universal human rights component because the
choice to marry is still with the individual and no one is prevented
from accessing the institution of marriage provided they meet the
essential conditions of voluntariness and purposiveness that such
freedom necessarily presupposes (such as the requirement that
they not be too closely related by family bond or blood) to either
negate voluntariness or affect the well-being of offspring. 10 6
103. Id. at 143.
104. Joseph Bozzuti, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions after Lawrence v.
Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet? 43 Cath. Law. 409, 440-41 (2004); Adrien Kath-
erine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black America: Global
Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 11 J. Contemp. Leg.
Issues 811, 861 (2001). But see Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polyg-
amy: Considering Polyamory, 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 439, 440-44 (2003).
105.
It may not always be easy to draw the line between [universal morality's]
mandatory-negative and permissive-affirmative applications to various cultural
practices. Especially where the practices are controversial the applications re-
quire both detailed empirical scrutiny of the practices in question, including their
causal backgrounds and effects, and careful analysis of how [universal morality's]
contents bear on these practices.
Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 154.
106. All states and most foreign countries that recognize legal marriage do justifiably set
conditions of age and mental awareness to guarantee that the parties seeking to marry are
truly acting voluntarily. For an example of state differences, compare N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-1-7 (Lexis 2007) ("All marriages between relations and children, including grandfa-
thers and grandchildren of all degrees, between half brothers and sisters, as also of full
blood; between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, are hereby declared incestuous and
absolutely void. This section shall extend to illegitimate as well as to legitimate children.")
with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01(A) (Lexis 2006) ("Male persons of the age of eighteen
357
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Still, some might challenge this argument on the ground that
it could create too wide an assortment of rights for society to rec-
ognize on the basis of self-fulfillment even with the caveat that no
one else's freedom or well-being is otherwise impaired. Even as-
suming that self-fulfillment might be limited to allow only those
life aspirations that benefit one's capacity to discover truth, jus-
tice, and beauty, whether in one's own life or that of another, this
would still create quite a few rights to be recognized. Yet, in most
instances, this would not be a problem, since the rights being rec-
ognized are handled by the negative privacy right of non-interfer-
ence with whatever may be the good life sought.10 7
What sets marriage in need of special attention is that the
state has already upset the equilibrium established by negative
privacy-right claims by recognizing only opposite-sex couples as
eligible to marry.10 8 This, for reasons already discussed supra, ig-
nores the similar capacity fulfillment that same-sex couples would
likely obtain if allowed to marry.10 9 Thus, the burden on the state
to actually do something, as opposed to contraception and abortion
rights cases, where the burden is to not interfere, arises only be-
cause the state has chosen to arbitrarily afford the special marital
status to certain individuals' private actions based on their gen-
der.110 Were the state to have left marriage unclassified and not
years, and female persons of the age of sixteen years, not nearer of kin than second cousins,
and not having a husband or wife living, may be joined in marriage.").
107. In The Right to Privacy: Gays, Lesbians and the Constitution, I identify the range of
the privacy right's protection to encompass all those actions that on examination do not run
afoul of a compelling state interest founded on protecting autonomy in general or violate
another right that will better foster maximal autonomy in the long run. Samar, The Right
to Privacy, supra n. 11, at 116-17.
108. See Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (West 2006); Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013 (Lexis 2007); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 25-101 (Lexis 2007); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-208, 9-11-109 (Lexis 2006); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 13 § 101 (Lexis 2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.212 (2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-
3.1 (2006); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572-1 (Lexis 2006); Idaho Code Ann. § 32-209 (Lexis
2006); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/213.1, 5/212 (2007); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1 (Lexis 2006);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.005, 402.045, 402.040 (Lexis 2006); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 89
(2006); 19-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 701 (2006); Md. Fain. Code Ann. § 2-201 (2006); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 551.1 (2006); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.03 (West 2005); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-
1 (Lexis 2006); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 451.022 (West 2007); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-401
(2005); Neb. Const. art. I, § 29; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2 (Lexis 2006); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-
03-01 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01 (Lexis 2006); Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2006);
23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 1704 (2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 (2006); S.D. Codified
Laws § 25-1-38 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 (Lexis 2006); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2
(Lexis 2006); Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2 (Lexis 2006); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.020 (2007); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-603 (Lexis 2006); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (2006).
109. Supra nn. 89-93 and accompanying text.
110. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a right of married
couples to use contraceptives and of doctors to advise in their use); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
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attempted its regulation, this issue would not have resulted.111
But as that is not the case, this argument must deal with the ineq-
uity that the state's action has created.
A corollary to the New York high court's decision is the ques-
tion: Why can the state not just afford special recognition in the
name of protecting children that heterosexual couples are able to
produce naturally? Here it seems to me that the answer is two-
fold. First, recognition of marriage involves a much wider traffic
of rights and privileges than would be the case if only the interests
of children were concerned. 112 Second, no state requires couples
to have a child or pledge to have a child in order to have a valid
U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (extending the right to obtain and use contraceptives to unmarried
persons); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 694-96 (1977) (extending the right
to obtain and use contraceptives to minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (up-
holding a woman's right, within some constraints, to choose abortion); Planned Parenthood
of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding Roe's recognition of a woman's right,
within some constraints, to choose abortion but replacing the Roe Court's trimester analy-
sis with an undue burden test).
111. Other issues, however, might arise. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 386 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court noted, "it would make little sense to recognize a
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society." The
argument for extending the right to marry to same-sex couples is bolstered by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003), where it struck down
a state sodomy statute prohibiting adult consensual sexual relations involving intimate
relationships between same-sex persons. This reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick after only
seventeen years suggests that the comment in Zablocki might now be interpreted to in-
clude same-sex relationships. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (reversing Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)). Note Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence:
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted
a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as
formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosex-
ual conduct is "no legitimate state interest" for purposes of proscribing that con-
duct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), "[wihen
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the con-
duct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring;" what justi-
fication could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution"?
Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting majority, citations omitted, brackets added by
Scalia, J.).
112. In his dissent, Judge Kaye stated:
The record is replete with examples of the hundreds of ways in which committed
same-sex couples and their children are deprived of equal benefits under New
York law. Same-sex families are, among other things, denied equal treatment
with respect to intestacy, inheritance, tenancy by the entirety, taxes, insurance,
health benefits, medical decisionmaking, workers' compensation, the right to sue
for wrongful death, and spousal privilege.
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 27 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting); see also Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1204(e)(1) to (24) (2006) (showing the range of the rights and privileges a
state marriage law may engage).
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marriage, and many same-sex couples do have children through
various means. 113
Finally, one might ask why-even if same-sex marriage is
part of the human right to marry-should that make it a legal, let
alone a constitutional right? The answer is that the Constitution
itself needs justification if it is to produce a duty of obedience that
is not all together sui generis and seemingly without justification.
Such a duty comes about only if the Constitution is itself morally
justified as laying out a scheme of government that protects fun-
damental human rights properly understood." 4 To this extent at
least, the courts are obliged to interpret the Constitution and the
scheme of government it creates so as not to violate universal
human rights and to maximize individual self-fulfillment when-
ever possible. 1 5 Extending the right to marry to same-sex couples
is just one example of how courts can interpret the Constitution to
satisfy its justificatory foundation to preserve and maximize indi-
vidual human rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our society is in the middle of a debate. But it is not a debate
between two different views of reality, but rather between a fic-
tion and a reality. On the one side is the view that marriage must
be maintained as a relationship between one man and one woman.
On the other side is the view that same-sex couples can marry.
Mediating the former view is the idea that the external goods of
marriage are necessary for stability and protection of offspring.
But this is a fiction unless at the same time one maintains the
erroneous assumption that opposite-sex couples are not capable of
handling such matters on their own. On the other side of the de-
bate is the argument that the internal goods of marriage are gen-
der neutral but sufficiently self-fulfilling that, when practiced
against a background in which individual freedom is protected, all
participants to the relationship gain and no one outside the rela-
tionship loses. Given that the state already recognizes a right to
113. Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples:
Developments in the Law, 39 Fam. L.Q. 683, 683 (2005) (noting that "[a]ccording to the
2000 United States Census data, one out of three lesbian couples and one out of five gay
couples are raising children in the United States.").
114. By "properly understood" I mean understood as deriving out of the essential condi-
tions of voluntariness and purposiveness that all moral theories must necessarily presup-
pose. See Gewirth, supra n. 1, at 79-80.
115. Vincent J. Samar, Justifying Judgment: Practicing Law and Philosophy (U. Press
of Kan. 1998) (arguing this point extensively; thus I will not belabor the matter here).
Vol. 68
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marry for opposite-sex couples, if this is not a sufficient basis to
extend that right to same-sex-couples, I do not know what would
be. It is then almost a self-evident truth that same-sex couples
ought to be afforded the same legal right to marry in the name of
human dignity that is afforded to opposite-sex couples.
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